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MARX'S THEORY OF ETHICAL JUSTICE 
George Callan-Woywod and David A. Duquette 
Historically, Marxist scholars and ideologues have 
shown little interest in extracting or developing a 
coherent system of justice, whether normative or des-
criptive, from Marx's writings. Sporadic attempts have 
been made, most notably by Bernstein, Kautsky, and Sel-
sam. These endeavors have resulted in such diverse con-
clusions—each demonstrating an affinity with either 
utilitarian, positivist, or Kantian themes--that the 
searches were seen as unconvincing and perhaps self-
serving. Over the past fifteen years, a renewed interest-
has surfaced concerning the problem of justice and Marx. 
Fueled by the wide distribution of Marx's early works 
and the Grundrisse, the evolution of Marxist humanism, 
the social unrest of the sixties, and the publication of 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice, philosophers have looked to 
Marx for help xn understanding,and formulating discus-
sion about justice. The results obtained so far have 
closely mirrored earlier results, although the improved 
quality of the work has helped to better define the prob¬ 
lem;-"- Yet the conclusions reached are still unsatisfy-
ing and discomforting at best. 
This failure has led several authors to conclude 
either that there is neither an explicit nor an implicit 
system of justice in Marx; or that if there is one, it 
is only a descriptive extension of Marx's mistaken theory 
of historical materialism (being therefore of no assis-
tance in the quest for descriptive accuracy or in the 
search for normative principles of justice). Both of 
these conclusions are currently in vogue and have been 
reinforced by the fact that those who would appear to 
have an interest in "revealing" such a system in Marx 
have not done so. The situation might well be left as 
it is if it were not for the fact that philosophers 
insist upon calling on Marx not simply to critique pos-
sible systems of justice, but to suggest that his work 
contains positive elements that need to be included in 
any coherent and satisfactory system of justice.^ 
The sources of the confusion and frustration in 
determining a Marxist concept of justice do not origi-
nate with those philosophers who have been working on 
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the topic, although they often contribute to it, but 
with the work of Marx. The explicit references to "jus-
tice" in Marx's work often appear to support the posi-
tion of those who maintain the non-existence or trivial-
ity of a theory of normative justice in Marx. Yet there 
can be no doubt that Marx did make numerous normative 
judgements, some of which seem-to imply just such a 
theory, then any attempt to uncover a coherent concept 
of justice must go beyond this surface evidence and 
search within the labyrinth of his relational constructs. 
Due to the nature of this task we cannot hope to accom-
plish more than the presentation of a broad outline of 
a possible theory of justice. The further development 
and defense of such a system would require a work of 
much greater length. 
We can, we believe, find the basis of a theory of 
justice in Marx, but not as justice systems are usually 
formulated in a theory of rights, at least where these 
rights are "atomic" in the sense of belonging to iso-
lated individuals. Rather, the basis will be found in 
a conception of the social good. Our task then will be 
to extract this notion from Marx by inquiring into the 
foundations of Marx's concept of the essence of social 
man. Discussions of the nature of social man are con-
tained both in Marx's philosophical writings, in which 
he finds man's "species being," and in Marx's economic 
work, in which man is the object of empirical study. 
The philosophic and empirical sides of Marx's study of 
man must be seen as complementary, as mutually suppor-
tive. The result is that the concept of the social good 
in Marx will not be derived, as is the case with most 
traditional theories of justice, from an isolation and 
idealization of abstract human characteristics, but will 
be the outcome of a conceptualization of what man is 
and of the potentiality which follows from his empirical 
being. 
Before we begin to sketch the foundations of this 
system, we must respond to those objections which would 
most obviously prohibit a priori this construction. 
There are many such objections and we will be unable to 
consider all of them. Therefore, we will limit our cri-
ticism to the work o f R . C. Tucker and Allen G. Wood who 
we believe are in the vanguard and representative of the 
general non-justice position. 3 It is our intention, at 
the very least, to provide sufficient reasons to cast 
serious doubt upon the validity of their arguments. 
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I 
A source of confusion which initially hinders any 
prospect of progress has been the failure to identify 
clearly the structural and procedural criteria that any 
theory of justice must satisfy. This has led such note-
worthy scholars as R. C. Tucker to dismiss any attempt 
to establish a Marxist system of justice because there 
appeared to be ho mechanism by which "a rightful balance 
in a situation where two or more parties are in con-
flict could be obtained" (Tucker, p. 51). The idea 
that rightful conflict resolution is the primary opera-
tional function of justice is widely accepted. For 
instance it is central to Rawls' theory of justice.1' 
There are, however, two serious problems with this view. 
First, it places the cart before the horse; it presup-
poses that whatever the concept of justice may be, it 
will recognize at least certain conflicts as having the 
character of being subject to more or less rightful 
balancing. But the scope, and applicability of this 
institutional function is derivative of the normative 
concept of justice under consideration. 
Tucker's conclusion may well be accurate if we are 
constructing a justice system within a liberal politi-
cal state complete with its traditional conception of 
competitive man, and of a society incapable of satisfy-
ing mankind's escalating desires. As Graeme Duncan 
points out, an important bellweather for the success of 
society in the liberal image is the existence of con-
flict.^ Liberals traditionally hold a pessimistic posi-
tion on the ability of mankind to live in harmony. 
According to liberal thought the elevation of harmony 
to the status of a highly desired value is most likely 
a mask for the denial of human freedom. Therefore not 
only is conflict inevitable for the liberal, it is a 
necessary condition of the "good society" which places 
extreme importance upon the development of an extensive 
system of rights balancing. Even if the liberal concep-
tion of society were correct, to presuppose liberal 
society as the standard by which to judge the components 
and structure of a Marxist system of justice is to beg 
the question. It assures that some form of bourgeois 
justice with its essentially "political" character is 
the only possible form of justice. Tucker commits the 
same fallacy of which Marx accused Smith, Ricardo, et 
al , that of mistaking particular categories for eter-
nal ones. 
The most serious problem with Tucker's assertion 
is that the emphasis it entails will misdirect our 
efforts. If justice's primary concern is the achievement 
of a rightful balance, then the Homiative principles 
which should serve els the" standard by which the quality of 
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justice is judged take a secondary role to the institu-
tional requirements placed on justice. "Procedural" 
becomes the fundamental defining term for the phrase 
"procedural justice." If we succumb to this initial 
demand of Tucker's criteria we find ourselves having 
certain normative relations already assumed. For 
instance, Tucker presupposes that conflicts are capable 
of just resolution. Iiis criteria also assume some mech-
anism, most likely a political state, whose purpose is 
not only to determine the meaning of justice.but to 
force acceptance of its judgement on its constituents. 
However, coercion as a tool of justice realization must 
be argued for. It is fairly clear from the work of Marx 
that he perceived political coercion as antithetical to 
the existence of, if not the realization of, communist 
society. To accept Tucker's argument is to prejudge 
Marx and is much like saying that Plato only had a 
theory of justice when he posited the right of coercion 
with the philosopher kings. 
The demands placed upon any system of justice must 
be correlative to the purposes and standards of that 
system. If we are right that Marx's concept of justice 
is embedded within communist society and is revealed by 
the actualization of man's species being, then certain 
criteria for the judgement of the functional require-
ments of that system can be stated. First, any system 
of normative justice must be able to satisfy the stipu-
lation that ought implies can. Therefore, any system 
or ideal regarding justice must be able to suggest the 
appropriate means to the realization of that society. 
There are additional functions that such a system 
should be able to satisfy; and although they are not 
strictly necessary, they would enhance the attractive-
ness of the theory: it should be able to demonstrate 
how the ideal system relates to the imperfect society, 
i.e., how it can function as an evaluative principle of 
justice. This function does become necessary if the 
judgement is to be made as to the relative 'justice' of 
different societies, e.g., socialist compared to capi-
talist. A Marxist system of justice should also be able 
to show that the means employed to bring about communist 
society are not antithetical to the achievement of jus-
tice. This list of requirements is not exhaustive and 
will expand as the system is developed. Care must be 
taken, however, not to make initial demands that require 
the inclusion of specific political and social institu-
tions . 
Tucker's further argumentation against a possible 
system of justice in Marx depends upon his showing both 
that Marx did not condemn capitalism for being unjust, 
and that he did not see communist society as being just. 
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Tucker shares his view with Wood on these claims, 
although their reasons for holding them differ. Begin-
ning with Tucker we will examine the latter argument 
and then return to a critique of Tucker's first argu-
ment . 
The thrust of Tucker's argument is that Marx does 
not have a distributive system of justice. Tucker 
argues that Marx did not perceive communist society as 
being just: the imperative "from each according to his 
ability to each according to his need" is a prescription 
of brotherhood, not of justice (and yet this imperative 
is the most likely candidate for a principle of justice). 
Two points need to be made here. Even if Tucker is 
rißht that Marx and Marxists see communist society as 
one of brotherhood, this does not preclude its being 
concerned with justice as well. The implicit suggestion 
made by Tucker is that brotherhood is a supererogatory 
duty above the demands of justice and ethics. But this 
conclusion is dependent upon the system of justice under 
consideration. Lenin certainly held not only that a 
communist society would be just, but in fact that it 
would be the only society in which justice would be pos-
sible. 6 The concept of fraternity is, according to 
Rawls, embedded in the difference principle. This prin-
ciple is the major component of Rawls' second principle 
of justice and is the fundamental characteristic which 
separates Rawls' system from traditional liberal sys-
tems (Rawls, p. 105ff). Tucker's point does have an 
application, however, in that the "need" prescription is 
not Marx's primary principle of justice, although it is 
certainly a derivative principle. 
Second, Tucker uses Marx's and Engels* attack on 
Proudhon and other socialists for emphasizing the need 
for redistribution of income as proof that for Marx 
"the principle of distributive justice is alien" (Tucker, 
p. 11). But Tucker misunderstands Marx's argument. 
Marx believed that Proudhon and others who argued for 
redistribution were mistakenly attacking the result of 
the capitalist system instead of the cause. Distribution 
was the result of the productive process (means and mode 
of production) and therefore distribution could not be 
successfully altered without changing the productive 
process. 
These modes of distribution are the relations 
of production themselves, but sub specie distribu-
tionis. It is therefore highly absurd when e.g. 
J. St. Mill says . . . 'The laws and conditions of 
the production of wealth partake of the character 
of physical truths. . . . It is not so with the 
distribution of wealth. That is a matter of human 
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institutions solely.' The laws and conditions of 
the 'distribution of wealth' are the same laws 
under different forms.' 
Tucker also argues that Marx did not perceive capi-
talist society as being unjust. This conclusion is not 
unique among critics of Marx and follows from the belief 
that Marx only recognized justice as a political' insti-
tution. Accordingly, the institution of justice was 
determined by the mode of production and the system of 
justice could only reflect the demands of the mode of 
production. Justice as a political institution reflec-
ted and served the demands and needs of capitalism; and 
to the extent that principles of justice entailed behav-
ior that was beneficial to capitalism, the system was 
just. 
We agree that Marx held a descriptive account of 
justice that was relative to its own historical epoch. 
Interestingly enough, Marx did not believe that capital-
ist society could satisfy the demands of its own system 
of justice. The decadence of capitalist society was 
revealed by its hypocritical behavior in relation to 
its own standard of justice. Marx did believe that 
bourgeois justice could become a reality, but only after 
the means of production passes into the hands of the 
state in the period of socialist transition. Marx, in 
a discussion of socialist society, argues that bourgeois 
rights are realized because "principles and practice are 
no longer at loggerheads." 8 For Marx "rights" by defini-
tion consist in applying equal standards to unequal indi-
viduals, producing unequal results. But, at least in 
socialist society, liberty and the worth of liberty 
become one as equal application becomes possible. 
Marx, however, certainly did consider capitalism 
unjust by an external standard of justice which was not 
tied to juridical and political concepts. What else are 
we to conclude from Marx's statement that "the theft of 
alien labor time in which the present wealth is based 
appears as a miserable foundation in face of [communist 
society]" (Grundrisse, p. 705). In the Grundrisse Marx 
makes it clear that the evaluation of concepts central 
to his notions of justice takes place on two levels, one 
internal and the other external. 
In present bourgeois society as a whole, the 
positing of prices and circulation etc., appears 
as the surface process, beneath which, however, 
in the depths, entirely different processes go 
on, in which their apparent individual equality and 
liberty disappear. It is forgotten, on the one 
side, that the presupposition of exchange value, as 
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the objective basis for the whole system of pro-
duction already implies compulsion over the indi-
vidual. . . . (p. 2'»7) 
Later Marx attacks the Proudhonists lor not ceeinp, 
that exchange value is an essential part of capitalist 
exploitation. 
The proper reply to them is: the exchange 
value or more precisely, the money system is in 
fact the system of equality and freedom, and that 
the disturbances which they encounter in the furthe 
development of the system are disturbances inherent 
in it, are merely the realization of equality and 
freedom, which proves to be inequality and unfree-
dom. Cp; 249) 
This distinction in Marx where the positing of a 
value on one "level" becomes its negation on another 
deeper "level" is not unusual in his work; and its appli 
cation has not gone unnoticed in a possible theory of 
justice. Eugene Kamenka says, "Marx's contrast between 
the 'rational society' ahd the political structure of 
'civil society,' then might be seen as a sound percep-
tion of the contrast between what we might call 'ethical 
justice' and 'political justice.'" 9 This distinction 
allows us to make sense of normative judgements by Marx 
which appear to appeal to justice talk, like the follow-
ing statement: "The accumulation of wealth at one end 
is at the same time the accumulation of poverty, hard 
labor, slavery, ignorance, growing bestiality, and moral 
decline at the other. . . . " 1 0 
Allen G. Wood's major objection to the finding of 
a theory of justice in Marx involves an appeal to Marx-
ist methodology. Because the concept of justice in 
Marx's historical analysis is a juridical notion that 
is dependent upon the mode of production, "the concep-
tions of right and justice which express this point of 
view are rationally comprehensible only when seen in 
their proper connection with other determinations of 
social life and grasped in terms of their role within 
the prevailing productive mode" (Wood, p. 25'»). Given 
this supporting role of juridical conceptions in social 
life, they cannot be used to measure the rationality of 
society; rather, they arise naturally from the particu-
lar relations of production that exist in a particular 
society at a particular time. The social activity of 
men will appear just when it coincides with the pre-
vailing mode of production, and will appear unjust when 
it contradicts that mode. "Just transactions 'fit' the 
prevailing mode, they serve 3 purpose relative to it, 
they concretely carry forward and bring to actuality 
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the process of collective productive activity of human 
individuals in a concrete historical situation" (Wood, 
p. 256). 
Given this interpretation of the methodological 
role of production in Marx's system, Wood concludes that 
for Marx justice cannot in the abstract be a rational 
standard for measuring human actions or institutions, 
and that there can be no eternal principles of justice 
which are applicable to each and every society. 
Rational assessments of the justice of particular acts 
are made with respect to their function in a specific 
mode of production and not in accordance with some uni-
versal formal conception of justice. Thus, it is mean-
ingless to say that capitalism is an unjust system if 
we mean to appeal to such formal conceptions. In res-
pect to the mode of production of capitalism the appro-
priation of surplus value by the capitalist is perfectly 
just, it conforms to the mode, whereas the use of slaves 
is unjust because it does not conform to this mode. 
A serious problem arises, however, when Wood 
attempts to account for Marx's own condemnation of capi-
talism. Wood appropriately recognizes that Marx charges 
capitalism with exploitation of the worker and that he 
calls for the abolition of the antagonism between capi-
tal and labor. But according to Wood, "This exploita-
tion of the laborer by capital is not a form of injus-
tice, but is a form of servitude" (Wood, p. 277). Marx's 
recognition of the domination of the worker inherent in 
capitalism, and the fact that it results in misery and 
degradation for the worker, does not involve a charge 
that capitalism is unjust, but simply that there is a 
fundamental antagonism within its mode of production. 
Hence, the need for emancipation by the workers "does 
not appear merely as a social ideal, but always as an 
actual movement within the existing production relations 
toward concrete historical possibilities transcending 
them" (Wood, p. 277). In effect, Wood finds thai-
Marx's criticism of capitalism's exploitation of the 
worker is simply a part of the recognition of the struc-
tural contradition in capitalism which will eventually 
lead to its downfall. 
An objection to this interpretation of Marx is that 
it leaves his condemnation of capitalism without 
rational justification. If, according to Wood, this 
condemnation cannot be rooted in any principle of jus-
tice, whence does such a condemnation issue forth? Does 
it come from the mere description of the breakdown of 
capitalist productive relations? To hold, as Wood does, 
that the mere recognition of the existence of exploita-
tion and domination constitutes an intrinsic condemna-
tion of capitalism does not explain why Marx used the 
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sort of normative language that he did to "describe" 
capitalist production. Some sort of explanation would 
seem to be of import if for Marx the mechanisms of capi-
talism which foster exploitation and domination are, 
given that mode of productionj just. And further, why 
should the breakdown of capitalxsm be taken as a fact 
to be applauded, and not one over which to be remon-
strative? According to Wood, "Marx's own reasons for 
condemning capitalism are contained in his comprehensive 
theory of the historical genesis, the organic function-
ing, and the prognosis of the capitalist mode of pro-
duction" (Wood, p. 281). When in the course of his 
analysis of capitalism Marx finds disguised exploita-
tion and unnecessary servitude, these of themselves 
appear as "good reason" for condemning it. Our objec-
tion to this involves the question of how it is that 
Marx finds such exploitation in capitalism; or how it 
is that Marx makes the implicit judgement that certain 
Conditions in capitalist society ought or ought not to 
exist. 
In concluding this section, let us summarize our 
arguments against those who oppose a theory of justice 
in Marx and indicate the direction that our exposition 
of such a concept in Marx will take. First, we have 
seen that for Tucker and others, the concept of justice 
is understood primarily in terms of rights and duties 
and conflict resolution. For Tucker, this means that 
concerning the justice of social productive relations, 
the primary question will be that of distribution, a 
question which Marx saw as secondary to the analysis of 
the mode of production. For Wood, this means that a 
theory of justice will have a functional role with 
respect to the prevalent mode of production, but that 
justice will be meaningless when abstracted from the 
historical circumstances of any given mode of produc-
tion. In both cases it is denied that Marx subscribes 
to principles of justice by which to judge the rational-
ity of capitalist society. Our contention is that this 
view is false, first because a concept of justice can 
be found in Marx which is not tied to juridical notions, 
and secondly, because a concept of justice external to 
those conceptions which Marx views as functional to 
various modes of production must be appealed to if 
Marx's own condemnation of capitalism is to be under-
stood rationally. Rather than attribute to Marx a poli-
tical or juridical conception of justice, we will focus 
on a conception which is primarily ethical in nature. 
As will become clearer in the analyses which follow, the 
ethical characteristics of this conception involve a 
model of actualized human activity which is ideal-orien-
ted. We will show that Marx does make an appeal to some 
external principle of justice, first by examining texts 
in Marx where we find the formal conception of species-
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being and then by directing ourselves to the analysis 
of capitalism in light of the concept of alienation. 
We hope to show how Marx's allusions to a formal 
principle of justice are buttressed by the manner in 
which Marx's analysis of capitalism develops. 
II 
In order to understand what constitutes ethical 
justice for Marx we must understand the nature of the 
social good. Man is viewed by Marx as fundamentally a 
social being; hence an analysis of justice in Marx will 
necessarily focus on the quality of social relations. 
Social relations can, however, be understood from a 
variety of perspectives depending on the sort of acti-
vities one finds as being in some sense primary in the 
relation of man to man. For example, we could choose 
to view man's fundamental activity as the exercise of 
political rights, or the expression of religious belief, 
or even as the prpcreator of his kind. In Marx, the 
fundamental activity of man is his labor and the social 
good is manifested in accord with the manner in which 
that labor is performed. Labor is chosen by Marx as the 
core concept of his system because it is the most con-
crete and universalizable activity that men engage in: 
concrete in that it is the sensuous expression of the 
human being; universalizable in that it is the precondi-
tion of all human existence. 
The role of the concept of labor in determining the 
notion of the social good has two important sides in 
Marx: one side involves a formal conception of the 
nature of the laboring activity; the other side involves 
the empirical analysis of the social forces in which 
the laboring activity manifests itself. It is not 
generally recognized by interpreters of Marx's system 
how these two sides are related, let alone the acknow-
ledgment that such a distinction can be made. For the 
purpose of understanding justice in Marx, this distinc-
tion is crucial, for it allows one to make sense of the 
obvious normative character of Marx's critique of capi-
talism, while avoiding rather implausible conflations of 
Marxism and philosophical traditions which are not in 
the spirit of Marx's methodology. 
A formal concept of the laboring activity can be 
found in Marx's early works, especially the Economic 
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 18U1. Here we find 
Marx stating that 
Man is a species being. . . because he treats him-
self as a universal and therefore a free being. . . 
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The universality of man is in practice manifested 
precisely in the universality which makes all 
nature his inorganic body—both inasmuch as nature 
is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the 
material, the object, and the instrument of his 
life activity. (Tucker, p. 61) 
Furthermore, 
Man makes his life-activity itself the objects of 
his will and of his consciousness. . . . In creat-
ing an objective world by his practical activity, 
in working-up inorganic nature, man proves himself 
a conscious species being. . . . This production 
is his active species life. Through and because 
of his production nature appears as his work arid 
his reality. The object of labor is, therefore, 
the objectification of man's species life: for he 
duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, 
intellectually, but also actively in reality, and 
therefore he contemplates himself in a world that 
he has created. (Tucker, p. 62) 
In effect, these extracts indicate that the essence 
of human activity is conscious production, viz. labor, 
and that this activity is a manifestation of the species-
life of the individual, a species-life which is itself 
the end of human activity. However, we find that his-
torically the species-life becomes merely a means of 
individual life and not also its end. 
For in the first place labor, life-activity, produc-
tive life itself appears to man merely as a means 
of satisfying a need--the need to maintain physi-
cal existence. (Tucker, p. 61) 
The proposition that man's species nature is 
estranged from him means that one man is estranged 
from the other, as each of them is from man's 
essential nature. (Tucker, p. 63) 
According to Adam Schaff, the phrase "species-being" 
has two importantly different meanings. 
First, one stresses that man belongs to a biological 
species as a specimen of this species; and second, 
one emphasizes that man possesses a certain model 
of what man should be like which is a result of 
his own reflection on the properties and tasks of 
his own species—a model which is a source of the 
norms of human conduct as a 1 Species-being.' x^ 
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Schaff further contends that as Marx's thinking 
matures, the notion of "species-being" transforms into 
a specifically sociological context, and that while 
characteristics of the biological species are retained, 
the emphasis comes to be placed on social relations. 
And in fact, in the Grundrisse Marx states that 
The fact that this need on the part of one can be 
satisfied by the product of the other, and visa 
versa, and that one is capable of producing the 
object of the need of the other and that each 
confronts the other as owner of the object of the 
other's need, this proves that each of them 
reaches beyond his own particular need etc. , as a 
human being, and that they relate to one another 
as human beings, that their common species-being 
is acknowledged by all. (p. 2'l3) 
Intrinsic to the notion of species-being, then, is 
the idea of human reciprocity, whereby each individual 
attains his ends by becoming a means for another, the 
function of this reciprocity being the fulfillment of 
universal and fundamental human needs. Because the 
relationship is one of reciprocity, the individual is 
not merely a means for another, for his social rela-
tion to the other is also one of mutual dependence. Men 
are dependent on one another in order to satisfy their 
needs but, more than this, they require one another as 
fully actualized human beings; and this implies that 
their sociality, as well as their particular needs as 
individuals, is the aim of their life activity. In 
ignoring this sociality, and in placing exclusive 
emphasis on the objects of need, man becomes dominated 
by his own products in the form of hostile social 
forces. Man's emancipation from these forces requires 
that he "get behind the secret of his own social prod-
ucts," that he recognize the intrinsic sociality of pro-
ductive activity (Duncan, p. 85). 
In order to understand explicitly how the concept 
of species-being serves to provide a model or principle 
of human interaction, the concept of need must be fur-
ther explored. Here we can only suggest the direction 
such a discussion would take. In focusing attention on 
what the concept of need embraces, as well as what the 
fundamental human needs are which contribute to the 
species-life of man, certain requirements come to the 
fore: first, the concept of need must be distinguished 
from the concept of interest in order that we be able 
to distinguish between the real and merely apparent 
means to species-life. Fundamental human needs dictate 
the direction that human interests ought to take; and 
interests which hamper the satisfaction of these needs 
are alienated. Secondly, need satisfaction is so 
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intrinsically tied to the productive process that the 
concept of need determines not only what the means are 
(in terms of objects of production), but the very man-
ner in which those objects are produced. This already 
hints at a distinction between material and non-material 
needs; thus for instance, we must understand the manner 
in which needs are treated and transformed historically 
through the process of objectification and in general 
how it is that "the capacity for objective activity" is 
itself a fundamental need.^ And thirdly, insofar as 
needs are Understood as proper to the essence of man's 
empirical being, this must be understood socially, for 
"the human essence is no abstraction inherent in a single 
individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of social 
relations." 1 , 1 
Thus, the concept of species-rbeing serves to pro-
vide a model or principles of human interaction which 
stands as ideal with respect to the historical modifi-
cations in social relations which put men at odds with 
the intrinsic character of their species-life. It was 
Marx's view that a proper understanding of the mode of 
production would provide the knowledge whereby man 
could liberate himself from dominating social forces. 
It is in terms of the concept of species-being that we 
are able to understand why man's situation under capi-
talism is one to be deplored. In addition, it is 
apparent in Marx's works that the liberation of man 
through the actualization of his essential nature was 
not an ideal posited from abstract speculation, but was 
reached through the universalization of traits which 
fundamentally define man's empirical being. 
Also central ho the concept of species-being is 
the idea of the Unity of nature and humanity. Produc-
tive activity is the mediation of the natural and human 
worlds such that when this activity is truly actualizing 
these worlds are inseparable. 
Activity and consumption both in their content and 
in their mode of existence are social; for only 
here does nature exist for him as a bond with man 
man. « . . Only here has what is to him his 
natural existence become his human existence, and 
nature become man for him. Thus society is the 
consumated oneness in substance of man and nature--
the true resurrection of nature--the naturalism of 
man and the humanism of nature brought to fulfill-
ment. (Tucker, p. 71) 
We will see that this theme of the internal connection 
of the natural and human worlds underlies Marx's analy-
sis of alienated labor where the estrangement of labor 
is in part an estrangement of the natural from the 
88 
human worlds. Furthermore, we will see that just as 
labor is the core concept in the notion of species-
being as a model for fulfilled productive activity, so 
it is the core concept underlying Marx's analysis of 
productive activity in capitalism. Thus, the concept 
of labor has both a prescriptive and descriptive func-
tion which are intrinsically tied together in Marx's 
works. In turning to Marx's critique of capitalism we 
will show how these functions are interrelated. 
Marx refers to the obtaining of surplus value by 
the capitalist as being in contradiction to the general 
law of exchange of commodities. It is important to 
understand the nature of this contradiction in order 
to understand the nature of Marx's condemnation of capi-
talism. To speak of a contradiction in the exchange 
relations is not prima facie to speak of an injustice 
in these relations, although even in the strict logical 
sense of contradiction, there is an inherent prescrip-
tive connotation, i.e., that one ought not to engage in 
contradictions. In Marx the contradiction is constitu-
ted in the fact that a surplus value results from the 
exchange of equal values; and the normative character 
of this contradiction is that the labor activity takes 
place in a manner in which it ought not to. That labor 
ought not to be performed under conditions which result 
in such a contradiction is not given merely in the fact 
that the worker "has actually given up a value greater 
than that of the sum of money received in the form of 
wages" or that the capitalist "buys without paying for 
it, an additional sum of labor, an excess over the 
quantity of labor contained in the money which he pays 
o ut.»16 T 0 complain of an injustice on this basis is to imply that some sort of rectification can be attained 
in the exchange relationship of capitalist and laborer; 
it is to make an appeal to bourgeois standards of jus-
tice. The basis of Marx's condemnation of capitalism 
does not lie in the phenomenal results, although these 
are certainly indications that something is amiss, but 
lies in the cause of these results, viz., the treating 
of labor, the creative power of human beings, as a 
commodity. The fundamental injustice in capitalism lies 
in the relation with which the laborer stands to his 
own laboring activity. 
If we are to speak of the injustice of capitalism 
on the basis of the manner in which labor manifests 
itself, then we must have some norm or model from which 
such a judgement can be made--the charge of injustice 
must be made with respect to some specific standard of 
justice. However, we must remember that, given Marx's 
thoroughgoing criticism of bourgeois productive rela-
tions, and of the social and political relations which 
arise therefrom, a standard of justice cannot be found 
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in these relations as they exist. In fact, conceptions 
of justice for Marx are determined by the productive 
relations in which man finds himself. How then can we 
speak of an external conception of justice in Marx? 
One of the features of Marx's analysis of capital-
ism which gives this analysis its uniqueness is its cri-
ticism of the basic presuppositions of capitalist pro-
duction. According to Marx, bourgeois political economy 
never goes deep enough in its analysis of bourgeois 
productive relations', it mistakes the immediate surface 
phenomena for the real underlying structures. We might 
say, then, that Marx attempts to get at the "deep struc-
tures" of bourgeois economy in order to explain fully 
and to make intelligible its workings. Once such a 
move is made to a deeper level of analysis, explanations 
which derive from the surface level will appear as 
incomplete, as merely begging the question of the eco-
nomy's real functionings. Talk of justice for Marx has 
historically occurred at this surface level, and there-
fore has had little validity in terms of explaining 
What is deficient in the social relations that are mani-
fest. Part of the Marxist claim is that for the first 
time there is a method of analysis which gets beneath 
the surface, which gives a true historical understanding 
of the development of capitalist society. Does this 
preclude the making of normative judgements at this deep 
level or the formulation of a standard which makes these 
judgements intelligible? These normative judgements 
are evident throughout Marx's work, and while the stan-
dards most often appear in Marx's earlier works, they 
serve as a theme which continually underlies his criti-
cal analysis of capitalism. Just as Marx's analysis of 
capitalism is. external to the presuppositions under 
which capitalism operates r so his conception of justice 
is external to those conceptions which accept capital-
ist structures. 
The concepts of alienation, exploitation, and 
domination are central to Marx's critiques of capital-
ist society; they indicate normative judgements which 
are aimed at the heart of the productive process. The 
source of the injustice of capitalism is not reducible 
to the capitalis's making a profit where the wealth 
that results is construed as some sort of theft of 
Value. Rather, the injustice is to be viewed as 
resulting from the nature of the productive relations• 
of labor. Money, for Marx, is only one of the forms 
which value can take, it is symbolic of how exchange 
value can take on a separate existence from labor and 
its product. "All the properties of the commodity 
viewed as exchange value appear as an object distinct 
from it; they exist in the social form of money, quite 
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separable from their natural form of existence" (Grund-
risse, p. 145). The more that exchange value takes on 
this external existence, the more the relationship 
between labor and its product becomes estranged, where 
the product in the form of value becomes an external 
force independent of and opposed to the producers. 
This notion of the externality of the product of 
labor from labor is the central theme in Marx's talk 
of the alienation, exploitation, and domination of labor 
This externality manifests itself in exchange relations 
in the separation of the double form of commodities, 
i.e., the separation of their natural form of existence 
(use value) from their social form (exchange value). 
"As soon as money becomes an external thing alongside 
commodities, the exchangeability of commodities for 
money is immediately attached to external conditions 
which may or may not occur; it is the victim of external 
conditions" (Grundrisse, p. 147). With the introduction 
of money, then, the bond between the natural and social 
forms of the commodity is broken. Whereas, originally, 
the exchangeability of commodities depends on their use 
values, natural properties which satisfy human needs, 
money represents exchange value which is cut off from 
these needs, required not for the satisfaction of these 
needs but for the accumulation of exchange value. This 
accumulation of exchange value is the process of creat-
ing capital, and it is in the form of capital that money 
comes to dominate labor. 
The sense in which labor is dominated by capital 
becomes clear when we look at the workings of the pro-
ductive process. While the laborer receives only the 
subjective conditions (means of subsistence) for the 
realization of his labor, the objective conditions (ma- • 
terials and instruments) stand opposed to labor in the 
form of capital which has re-entered the productive pro-
cess. This results from the exchange of living labor 
power for a quantity of objectified labor which is 
labor's own product. This objectified labor appears to 
the laborer as alienated labor, as labor which was not 
the creation of the laborer, but which stands in the 
exchange as something foreign to him. Superficially, of 
course, this alien labor appears to be derived extern-
ally from the process of the circulation of capital, 
but it is from labor itself that this alien labor is 
created. Surplus value is the key to understanding the 
power of capital, and surplus value is constituted by 
congealed labor time: it is objectified labor which . 
finds its way back into the productive process in the 
form of the objective and subjective conditions of pro-
duction. Thus, the different forms which surplus value 
takes on, viz., the surplus product, capital, and 
objectified labor as a re-input into the production 
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process, are all the creation of living labor. "All 
the factors which were opposed to the living labor 
power as forces which were alien, external, and which 
consumed and utilized the living labor power under 
definite conditions which were themselves independent 
of itj" are now established as its own product and 
result" (Grundrisse, p. 451). 
In effect then, the fundamental antagonism in the 
productive process can be seen as constituted it) the 
opposition of surplus objectified labor over necessary 
labor (that which reproduces the laborer), a surplus 
which is continually being exchanged against living 
labor as if it were independent of that living labor. 
What appears at first as the independent power of capi-
tal to provide the means of production for making pos-
sible the realization of living labor, as expressed 
in the divorce of capitalist private property from 
labor, is really the product of labor itself. Thus, 
"The more labor objectifies itself, the greater will be 
the objective world of values that faces it in the form 
of alien property. Through the creation of surplus 
capital, labor lays on itself the necessity of creating 
new surplus capital once more, etc., etc." (Grundrisse, 
p. 455). 
The injustice of capitalist private property, then, 
follows from the injustice of the productive process. 
With the exception of the primordial situation (in 
which values are originally held which are not a result 
of capital and which are exchanged with the laborer for 
living labor power)* the creation of capital as private 
property is the result of a previous acquisition of 
alien labor. In other words, the prerequisite for capi-
tal, values which can be thrown back into the production 
process in the form of private property, is the appro-
priation of labor value without exchange (surplus 
value).. Each appropriation of objectified labor 
serves as the condition for further appropriation. Here 
"property appears as the right to appropriate alien 
labor, and the impossibility of labor appropriating its 
own product by itself. The complete divorce between 
property (still more, wealth) and labor thus appears as 
the consequence of the law that originally identified 
them" (Grundrisse, p. 458). In the Paris Manuscripts 
Marx anticipates this analysis of the relation of pro-
perty to labor when he says, "private property is thus 
the product, the result, the necessary consequence, of 
alienated labor, of the external relation of the worker 
to nature and to himself" 1 8 (Tucker, p. 65). 
It can be seen, theni tliat there is a definite con-
gruity between Marx's concept of species-being and his 
empirical analysis arid critique of capitalist production. 
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Labor always appears in Marx as the root concept, 
both in terms of the condemnation of the alienation 
found in capitalist social relations and in terms of 
the condemnation of the alienation found in capital-
ist social relations. Species-being provides a model 
which focuses on the productive activity of man as it 
relates to both his natural and his social being. 
Man's species-being is a means of satisfying his 
natural needs and wants, and the satisfaction of these 
needs and wants is a means of fulfilling his social 
being. As we have seen in Marx's critical analysis of 
capitalism, the theme of the externality of man's 
social being from his natural being reoccurs, and its 
explanation refers to the way in which the forms of 
this social being emerge out of the productive process. 
Fundamentally, the separation of natural man from social 
man is the result of the manner in which labor repro-
duces itself; it results from labor producing itself 
as alien labor, labor which is sold as a commodity in 
exchange for conditions which allow the productive 
activity (under capitalism) to take place. The separa-
tion of man's natural and social being is inherently a 
subordination of men to their social relations; for 
while producers are universally interdependent insofar 
as exchange value becomes the means for the satisfaction 
of individual needs, the externality of exchange value 
in the form of capital makes it subject to a fortuitous 
accumulation of value for its own sake. As a result 
there is an isolation of the private interests of indi-
viduals from one another (made acute by the division of 
labor) where the only social unity to be found is in a 
supply and demand market of indifferent individuals. 
The situation of the producers is such "that their pro-
duction is not directly social, not the offspring of an 
association that divides the labor among its members. 
The individuals are subordinated to social production, 
which exists externally to them as a sort of fate" 
(Grundrisse, p. 158). 
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Unlike many philosophers who have searched for 
Marx's concept of ethical justice in Marx's and Engel's 
sketchily drawn picture of communist society, we have 
instead turned to the analysis of the companion and com-
plementary notions of economic criticism and species-
being. Our analysis has reached the conclusion that the 
purpose of the Marxist principle of justice is to maxi-
mize man's ability to actualize both the eternal and his-
torically relative characteristics of his species-being. 
This proposed actualization will require that the prin-
ciple of justice entails the abolition or modification of 
such institutions as commodity exchange, division of 
93 
labor, and private property, so long as these institu-
tions impede man's quest for freedom from physical 
restraint and Goc.ial coercion. 
One of the results of our approach has been that 
we have avoided entangling ourselves in the complex web 
of historical materialism, although its shadow lias 
always been present. In this concluding section we will 
briefly discuss historical materialism in order to argue 
that this doctrine is best understood if it allows at 
least for the limited intervention of human actions 
which are seen as resulting from man's free critical 
consciousness. 
If Marx held a hard determinist position in the 
guise of historical materialism, he would be as open to 
similar charges concerning the legitimacy of his making 
normative moral judgements as Spinoza, Freud, and Skin-
ner are. Marx's position on this subject is at best 
unclear. Often * particularly in his economic writings, 
he appears to see historical materialism as a completely 
determinist doctrine, although the determining compo-
nents are not nearly as simplistic as many critics 
would have one believe. It is, therefore, quite under-
standable that scholars such as Tucker reach the conclu-
sion that "justice" is purely a politically descriptive 
term for Marx. But we believe a more reasonable des-
cription of historical materialism is that it is a doc-
trine which allows for the intervention of critical and 
free human consciousness. The parameters within which 
this free consciousness can operate will be more or 
less restricted depending upon the specific state oP 
the material conditions at a specific time. As Mihailo 
Markovic says, "The activity of historic agents, men, 
unlike the behavior of things and non-human living organ-
isms, can under certain conditions be free and univer-
sal" (Markovic, p. 12). If this interpretation is cor-
rect, then sense can be made of this quote from Marx, 
"Is it not a delusion to substitute for the individual 
with his real motives, with multifarious social circum-
stances pressing upon him, the abstraction of "free 
will"--one among the qualities of man for man himself?" 
(Feuer, p. 489). 
The most satisfactory evidence within Marx's work 
for supporting the conclusion that historical material-
ism is not simply a hard determinist doctrine, is sup-
plied by his political work where he continually exhorts 
the proletariat to act in a revolutionary fashion that 
precludes the occurrence of state of chaos, anarchy, 
and reaction which are potential results of revolution-
ary activity. As Graeme Duncan notes, "[Marx3 does not 
regard consciousness as simply_reflexive and dependent, 
and the actual diversity of ideology in terms of 
94 
progressiveness, proximity to economic conditions and 
interest, and form and degree of restraint by economic 
conditions, presumably give consciousness some scope 
and independence in particular circumstances" (Duncan, 
p. 144). 
Our final point is that the conception of justice 
we have drawn is not reflexively tied to Marx's concept 
of political and communist society. Marx believed that 
the political state in class society existed for the 
purpose of oppressing the subservient class and as a 
necessary mechanism for the transition to classless 
society. Therefore, once the distinctions of economic 
class were eliminated and everyone became a member of 
the proletariat, the coercive function of the state 
would no longer be necessary, and this function would 
disappear. The organizational and coordinating func-
tions of the state would still exist but values would be 
shared by the entire society; as a result, cooperative 
activity among its members would be voluntary. In addi-
tion, akrasia would be less prevalent because of the 
lack of societal hypocrisy and the identification of per-
sonal self-interest with the interests of the society. 
Whatever disciplinary action were needed would be per-
formed by the violator's peers. While we believe there 
is much to be said in favor of this model, one hundred 
years of history has shown that the coercive behavior of 
the state will not be so easily erradicated, nor will 
the simple abolition of economic classes guarantee a 
harmonious relation among people. The problem is more 
complex than Marx envisioned. Therefore, the conditions 
which Marx saw as necessary implementing criteria of 
communist society will be different. One of the advan-
tages of locating Marx's concept of justice in species-
being is that society can be judged rationally as well 
as empirically by its success in promoting those charac-
teristics and satisfying those needs which can be iden-
tified as being essential for the actualization of 
species-being. One of the major tasks in more clearly 
defining the concept of Marxist justice will be the ela-
boration of those needs legitimate to species-being. 
University of Kansas 
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While in the exchange relation the worker gets 
the equivalent of the value of his labor (as measured 
by the labor time that is socially necessary to produce 
it) in the form of wages, he does not get anything in 
return for the value that his living labor creates in 
the productive process. In selling the use value of his 
labor the worker gives up its value creating capacity to 
the capitalist. This value creating capacity, and its 
resulting appearance in the form of surplus value, is 
not the subject of the exchange relation insofar as 
accumulated values are concerned, and yet it is neverthe-
less transferred from the worker to the capitalist in 
the act of exchange. 
l s 
We should not here that (a) the law of exchange 
is itself vitiated by the contradiction in the relation 
between capitalist private property and labor; and (b) 
while capitalist private property appears as the source 
of alienation insofar as the use of capital results in 
a further appropriation of alien labor to the misery of 
the workers, capital itself comes about (both logically 
and materially) through the original alienation of labor 
where it is first treated as a commodity subject to 
exchange. 
